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Whales: Towards A Developing Right of
Survival as Part of an Ecosystem
SUDHIR K. CHOPRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the International Whaling Commission ("IWC") is faced with
the most difficult problem in its entire history. The issue is whether to
allow resumption of commercial whaling in 1990. This situation is further
complicated by the following fact: present IWC membership represents a
large world public opinion favoring a permanent ban on any type of com-
mercial whaling than the commission has at any time in its history. In the
past, the IWC was considered an organization created to protect the in-
terests of whaling nations. Current membership, including many non-
whaling states and states which have banned all types of whaling activity,
is much larger and endorses the global view favoring protection of whales
with an overwhelming majority. However, the presence of whaling states
in the IWC eagerly waiting to resume commercial whaling makes it diffi-
cult to reach a compromise for development of a globally accepted policy
for the conservation and protection of whales. As an option, the whaling
states can withdraw from the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling' and resume commercial whaling as permitted by the freedom
of fishing principle.' Both the Geneva Convention on Fisheries and the
Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 allow freedom of fishing on the high
seas
3
New marine living resources of the Southern Ocean are under a new
regime created by the Convention for the Conservation of Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR). The Southern Ocean is an area with large whale
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1. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, U.K.T.S. No. 5 (1949), Md. 7604; 2 P. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF WHALING 689 (1985). For a detailed analysis of the Whaling Convention, see
1 P. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 168-204 (1985); S. LYSTER, INTERNA-
TIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 17-38 (1985); D. JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 399-401
(1965).
2. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
(1958), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 131 L-54, art. 1.
3. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 116(a),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 621 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Law of the Sea Convention]; 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
4. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),
May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980), 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240, U.K.T.S. No. 48
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stocks, and remaining whale-rich areas which fall under the 200 miles ex-
clusive economic zones 5 are controlled by the coastal states. Therefore,
major areas of whale stocks are either under conservation regimes of
CCAMLR or coastal state fisheries zones. Significantly, some of those
coastal states which are looking forward to resumption of their whaling
activity. Some of the major coastal states, such as Australia,' Finland,"
and the United States,8 have not only banned whaling in their fisheries
zones, but also condemn such activity at the global level. However, other
states such as Japan, 9 the Philippines,'0 and the Republic of Korea" are
eagerly awaiting the resumption of commercial whaling.
This scenario requires a fresh assessment of not only the developments
at the IWC but also evaluation of every other area of international law
which directly or indirectly affects whales. Also to be considered are prin-
ciples embodied in other global conventions which require management of
natural resources on the "ecosystem management" approach. This ap-
proach requires the management of resources without disturbing the deli-
cate balance between different species of the "whole" ecosystem. Devel-
opments under national laws of several countries which effectively protect
their marine mammal resources in their 200-mile fisheries zones are
equally important to assess the evolution of conservation laws. In addi-
tion, the significant role of developing jurisprudence of animal rights,
such as right to life, right to survival, and some recognition towards hav-
ing a legal representation, need to be considered here.
This paper shall amalgamate international legal principles affecting
whales with the philosophy of animal rights and environmental ethics.
Such an amalgamation is necessary in order to assess if the analysis and
aggregate of these principles does help in formulating "a right of sur-
vival" for whales "as part of the ecosystem they live in." For the purpose
of this paper, the details of each principle of international law will not be
discussed. Instead, the paper will identify of some of the more important
norms and then go on to analyze them.
(1982), Md. 8714. For discussions of CCAMLR, see LYSTER, supra note 1, at 156-177, and 1
W. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1982).
5. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, arts. 55-58, 65. Also see R. Osterwoldt,
International Law and Politics of Conservation: Two Conventions and the Whales 231-244
(1984) (unpublished Master of Literature Politics thesis, submitted at St. Anne's College,
Oxford University).
6. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./opening statement (1979).
7. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 35th Mtg./opening statement (1983).
8. See supra note 6.
9. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./opening statement (1987).
10. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./opening statement (1985).
11. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./opening statement by the Republic of Korea
(1987).
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II. BASIC PRINCIPLES RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING
TO WHALES CONSERVATION
Some basic principles developed by the International Whaling Com-
mission and other international conventions which directly or indirectly
deal with whales do elaborate as to how human behavior and practices
towards whales should be regulated. These basic principals set certain cri-
teria as to how whales should be treated and as to why they should be
conserved and protected. No doubt these developments were slow in com-
ing, yet the aggregate of these norms and recommendations does provide
a strong basis to argue for the whale's right of survival as part of an
ecosystem. These principles in brief can be stated as:
A. IWC (1946)
(a) It is in the interest of the nations of the world to safeguard for
future generations the great natural resource represented by the whale
stocks; 2
(b) That in view of the "history of whaling [which] has seen over
fishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after another
to [near extinction,] it is essential to protect all species of whales from
further over fishing."1 3
B. IWC and UNCLOS-I (1958)
"Requests states to prescribe, by all means available to them, those
methods for the capture and killing of marine life, especially of whales
and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible"
(emphasis added).14
C. Stockholm Declaration (1972)
That the "natural resources of the earth including . ..flora and fauna
and specialty representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safe-
guarded for the benefit of present and future generations. . . .Man has
special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of
wildlife." In the light of these principles, the Declaration recommended a
ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. 5
12. International Whaling Convention, supra note 1, at 74.
13. Id.; See also Article I (2), which describes the scope of the ICRW to include "fac-
tory ships, land stations and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the Contracting Gov-
ernments, and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory ships, land sta-
tions, and whale catchers."
14. Resolution V, Humane Killing of Marine Life. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.56. Full
text of Resolution is reproduced in Johnston, supra note 1, at 495, 497 (Appendix). This
Resolution was passed by the UNCLOS-I in 1958 along with the 1958 Geneva Convention
on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Seas. Following year at the
10th meeting the IWC accepted this resolution (Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 10th Mtg (1959) at
para. 15).
15. Principle 2 and 24 and Rec. 33 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
1989
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D. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1978).
That export, import and transit of certain species of wild animals
and plants, trade in which might endanger their survival is prohibited.
Almost all whale species are included in the prohibited list.'6
E. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora
(a) That in view of "the unique nature of [Antarctic] . . . fauna and
flora . . . and particularly their defenselessness [sic] and susceptibility to
extermination . . . [Treaty parties] consider the Treaty Area as a Special
Conservation Area."' 7
(b) That any harvesting in the area covered by the CCAMLR shall be
conducted in such a way as to ensure the objective of "maintenance of the
ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related popu-
lations . . . and the restoration of depleted populations .
F. Law of the Sea Convention (1982)
That LOS Convention recognizes the "right of coastal state or inter-
national organizations, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this
[Convention] . . .and that states cooperate with a view to the conserva-
tion of marine mammals..
G. IWC Meeting (1982)
That there shall be a "moratorium on the taking, killing, treating of
whales, except mink whales. . . . This moratorium applies to sperm
whales, killer whales and baleen whales" and that catch limits for the
killings for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986
coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero."0
H. U.N. Resolution on the World Charter for the Nature (1982)
"The genetic viability on earth shall not be compromised; the popu-
lation levels of all life forms . . . must be at least sufficient for their sur-
vival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safeguarded.
Conference on Human Environment, held in 1972 of Stockholm U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/
Rev. 1, [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
16. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species opened for signature
March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; 993 U.N.T.S. 243; 12 I.L.M. 1085 [hereinafter CITES] and
CITES Proceedings of the 4th Meeting, 1063-69, 1118 (1983). See also LvSTER, supra note 1,
239-277.
17. Preamble, Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora,
Rec. II-Il, 1 BUSH, supra note 4, at 146.
18. Article II (3)(b), CCAMLR, supra note 4; BUSH, supra note 4, at 402.
19. Article 65, Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3.
20. Amended para. 10 of the Schedule of ICRW. For full text, see BmNIE, supra note 1,
at 714.
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"All areas of the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these
principles of conservation; special protection shall be given to unique ar-
eas, to representative samples of all different types of ecosystems and to
the habitats of rare or endangered species."21
I. World Conservation Strategy (1980)
Under the heading Global Commons strategy recommends that
"moratorium should be extended to all commercial whaling until the con-
sequences for the ecosystems concerned of removing large portions of the
whale's populations, and such populations' capacity for recovery can be
predicted."22
By no means this list of principles and recommendations is exhaus-
tive. There are many other regional and species related agreements,
which in one way or the other overlap with objectives and activities of the
IWC.23 Two of these need a brief mention here: the UNEP Guiding Prin-
ciples for Shared Natural Resources24 and the Convention on the Conser-
vation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979.25 Both the Conven-
tion and the Guideline require that the states must protect wild species
passing through their territory. This requirement is based on the fact that
a concerted effort of all the concerned states is necessary to protect these
resources.
III. ENVIRONMENTALISM, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ECOLOGY
Although it appears from the previous discussion that conservation-
ism is a relatively new phenomenon, which gained strength in the after-
math of 1972 Stockholm Declaration, that is not true. Long before schol-
ars began to formulate "theories of resource scarcity, propounding the
merits of wise use, or advocating techniques of efficient management,
primitive cultures were developing different attitudes towards 'nature,'
animals and plants."26 The first known conservation legislation was en-
acted in England in 1534 to protect the wild fowl.27 There are many in-
stances of such conservation-oriented laws after the 17th century, devel-
oped mainly by Britain and the United States. Earlier international
measures for the protection of wildlife can be found in: the 1875 Declara-
tion for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture;2" the 1902 Conven-
21. W. BURHENNE & W. IRWIN, THE WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE 10 (1983).
22. World Conservation Strategy, IVCN-UNEP-WWF (1980).
23. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 373-74, 381-82, 386-404, 512-21, 545-48.
24. U.N.G.A. Res. 33, adopted 15 December 1978; BIRNIE, id. at 373-75.
25. 19 I.L.M 5-32 (1980); LYSTER, supra note 1, at 278-98
26. JOHnyTON, The Environmental Law of the Sea; Historical Development, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA 17 (D. Johnston, ed. 1981); M. NICHOLSON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REVOLUTION; A GUIDE FOR THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD 132-140 (1970).
27. JOHNSTON, id.; NICHOLSON, id., at 141.
28. IV B. RUSTER & B. SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TREA-
TIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 1561.
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tion to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture;29 the 1916 U.S.-Canadian Mi-
gratory Birds Convention; 0 and the 1936 U.S. Mexican Agreement for
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals."
The modern conservation movement is based on scientific knowledge
and owes its roots to naturalists and biologists. It was not until the 1960s,
according to Professor Johnston, that "'environment,' 'pollution,' 'ecol-
ogy,' 'quality of life' and related issues became matters of public and po-
litical concern. '3 2 Since the 1960s environmentalism has emerged as "a
concept, as a mood, as a perspective . . . and especially as a cause."3"
The next issue to be considered is whether animals have legal rights.
Some scholars say yes, animals do have legal rights. They are protected
by laws and refer to anti-cruelty laws which have been in existence for a
long time. " There is no doubt that anti-cruelty laws can be traced back
to 1641 in the United States 6 and 1876 in Britain3 6 and many more coun-
tries. But these laws do not give any legal rights to animals - they are
merely reflections of our sentiments towards animals and at best can be
described as recognition by civilized societies of our moral duties towards
animals, i.e., it is morally wrong to inflict cruelty and suffering on
animals.
The next issue is the sufficiency of these laws. Perhaps not because
these laws, as Rollin describes, "take the people who own or use animals
as primary objects of moral concern, rather than animals themselves."3 7
And in effect these laws are primarily designed to protect human interest.
For example, the law may define cruelty with a long list of acts as cruel
such as: overworking of animals, torture, torment, depriving of necessary
sustenance, unnecessary or cruel beating, needless mutilation, needless
killing, but the words like "unnecessary" and "needless" render the whole
law ineffective." When it comes to protecting animals from cruelty, we
find that words such as "needless" and "unnecessary" make the judgment
so very relative and biased in favor of humans that all prohibited acts of
cruelty can be justified. The problem here is law is designed to serve
humans who own or can own animals as property. So what we have in the
29. Id. at 1615.
30. Id. at 1723.
31. Id. at 1723.
32. JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 39; Johnston, International Environmental Law: Re-
cent Developments and Canadian Contributions, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 555-59 (R. Macdonald, G. Morris and D. Johnston, eds.
1974).
33. JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 39.
34. See generally E. LEAVITT et al, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 1970).
This book provides a survey of American Laws from 1641 to 1970 and of the laws of many
other countries.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at app. viii.
37. B. ROLLIN, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN MORALITY 77 (1981).
38. Id. at 78.
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name of animal cruelty laws are not the laws which grant any legal rights
to animals. If we were to grant rights to animals, then they could have
legal action instituted on their behalf instead of on behalf of their owner,
and have their injuries legally considered rather than the injury to their
owner.3 9 We can therefore, from the above analysis, safely conclude that
so far we have not granted any rights to animals and have neither recog-
nized our duty towards animals. The only recognition so far accorded is
we should not in principle treat animals in a manner which can be de-
scribed as cruel, unless it is necessary.
Now let us compare our own rights and duties. Regan describes two
categories: moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are "those indi-
viduals who have the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear
on the determination of what. . . morally ought to be done and, having
made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as mo-
rality . . . requires."'4 It is the moral agents who can interact with each
other from the moral community because only these individuals owe
moral duty to each other. It sounds simple, but it does not work like this
because what Regan describes as moral patients are also included in
moral community. Moral patients lack the ability to decide between right
and wrong, they cannot perform the morally proper act. Examples of this
are "infants, young children, mentally deranged or enfeebled of all
ages."41 These people are conscious and sentient and can experience pain
and pleasure. Some of the passive animals can be compared to moral pa-
tients since both can experience pain and pleasure and since both lack
the ability to make moral decisions. In case of humans classified above as
moral patients, we have accepted our duty towards them, we do take into
account any injury caused to them and recognize not only our duty but
their rights to sue and have legal action instituted on their behalf. How-
ever, animals have been kept out of this special privilege accorded to
moral patients. Singer describes this attitude as one based on
speciesism.42 He further says that our faulty concepts about other animals
is due to our speciesist attitudes and that we have always considered our-
selves less savage than the other animals. Singer explains this reasoning
in these words:
To say that a person is "humane" is to say that he is kind; to say that
he is "a beast," "brutal," or simply that he behaves "like an animal"
is to suggest that he is cruel and nasty. We rarely stop to consider
that the animal that kills with the least reason to do so is the human
39. Id. at 81.
40. T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 151 (1983). See generally Warren, The
Rights of Non-Human World, in ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 109 (R. Elliott, A. Gare, eds.
1983); P. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 219-240
(1986); R. ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 140-162 (1983).
41. REGAN, id., at 153. Cf. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing - Toward Legal Right
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 451 (1972).
42. P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
223-258 (1975).
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animal. We think of lions and wolves as savage because they kill; but
they must kill, or starve. Humans kill other animals for sport, to sat-
isfy their curiosity, to beautify their bodies, and to please their
palates."3
Rachels supports Singer's position and says, "Human activities that in-
volve killing animals - hunting, trapping, meat production, and scientific
research - all involve such cruelty "that they need to be rejected for that
reason alone.""' Kant prefers an "indirect duty" owed to animals, any-
thing more than that does not conform to his views on the nature and
morality. Kant says:
Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as means to an
end. That end is man.. . . Our duties to animals are merely indirect
duties to mankind . . . [man] must practice kindness towards ani-
mals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings
with me ... "
Regan does not agree with Kant's description of animals as not being self-
conscious, which in Regan's opinion has been proven to be contrary. This
criteria, if applied to moral patients, in Regan's view will also disqualify
them from our direct duty towards them. Rawls, yet another philoso-
pher, is confused about duties owed to animals. Rawls starts with an ex-
plicit requirement: that to qualify as a direct object of justice, one "must
be capable, to a certain minimum degree, of a sense of justice,"4 then
modifies his position and does not require "the capacity for a sense of
justice . . . [as] necessary to be owed duties of justice" but adds a quali-
fier again and says "we are not required to give strict justice to creatures
lacking this capacity."48 At the same time, Rawls acknowledges that "it is
wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of whole species can be
great evil."' 9 Applying Regan's classification of moral agent and moral pa-
tient to Rawls' qualifications, "moral patients" along with animals will
also be disqualified from receiving "strict justice". Therefore, although
Rawls' prescription of qualifications is questionable and at best some-
times favoring some kind of relaxation, his later acknowledgement that
cruelty to animals is wrong and destruction of whole species is a great evil
does support the position that we owe duties and justice to animals to the
degree that we do not cause cruelty and destroy species. He admits that
his requirement of qualification "does not follow that there are no re-
43. Id. at 235.
44. Rachels, Do Animals Have Right to Life?, in ETHICS AND ANIMALS 275 (H. Miller,
W. Williams eds. 1983); cf. H. MCCLosKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS 64 (1983).
45. 45 E. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 239-40 (L. Infield trans. 1963). See also Rachels,
id., at 276; REGAN, supra, note 40 at 177-78.
46. REGAN, supra note 40, at 178.
47. Rawls, Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 284 (1963); REGAN, id, at 165.
48. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 512 (1971); REGAN, id.
49. RAWLS, id.; REGAN, id. at 166. See also Greenwalt, Religious Convictions and Law-
making, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 368 (1985).
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quirements at all in regard to [animals]." 50
Rachels theorizes the right to life by differentiating between "having
a life" and "being alive". He explains that being alive is merely a biologi-
cal notion, for example, a person in a coma is alive but does not have a
life, a lower animal is alive but does not have a life. To have a life one
must have a biographical notion, e.g., apart from being alive this individ-
ual has grown, developed certain relations, reacts and acts to environ-
ment, can experience pleasure, identify dangers, show emotions, and so
on. 51 According to Rachels, then, "an individual has a right to life if that
individual has a biographical life" and then goes on to say that by "this
criterion, at least some nonhuman animals would have such a right.
'52 It
seems reasonable that many mammals would qualify under this classifica-
tion since many mammals including whales, monkeys, dogs, etc. have
emotions, they care for each other, and have their own social system, and
thus live a biographical life and not a mere biological existence as living
beings. What Rachels determines here is based on socio-biological factors,
free from human logic and rationale of duties versus rights, barring strict
construction of the notion of rights or duties, it seems that at least these
animals which can distinguish themselves from a mere biological exis-
tence can qualify and do qualify for a right to life. Some authors, how-
ever, do not agree with conditions which separate more intelligent ani-
mals from the less intelligent ones. They prefer to advocate for animal
liberation by "extending to animals the same sort of moral protection for
their interests as we already enjoy for ours. 53
So far we have discussed "loosely" though about the duties owed to
animals, if any, and why, and whether they have some kind of rights re-
gardless of whether we recognize it or not. The above discussion provides
ample substance and we ought to include at least the more intelligent
species in the category of "moral patients" and recognize their right to
life. Now we shall look into the importance of protecting representative
ecology in order to conserve the ecosystems. Leopold describes ecosystem
as a "biotic pyramid" in which plants are dependent on sun, soil and
water; insects on plants and sod; birds on plants and insects, and so on.
This chain includes all animals which need the smaller ones for their sur-
vival. There are food chains which are so interdependent that to destroy
any one single layer will ultimately destroy the whole ecosystem.5
Stone writes that in order to "be able to get away from the view that
Nature is a collection of useful senseless objects," we should "be able to
reach heightened awareness of our own, and others' capacities in their
50. RAWLS, id.
51. Rachels, supra note 44, at 280-283.
52. Id. at 282.
53. S. SAPONTIZIS, MORALS, REASON, AND ANIMALS 174 (1987).
54. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND
RIVER 225 (1970).
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mutual interplay."5 Wenz argues against the senseless destruction of
ecosystem on the pretext that ultimately protected ecosystems are for
human benefit - for further research and better understanding. While he
agrees that it is not necessary for ecosystems to have rights, he draws
attention to our obligations not to destroy anything that "is good of its
kind - so long as the kind in question does not make it something bad in
itself."56 Ralston strongly argues for the importance of ecosystem; he crit-
icizes those who build up their arguments for duties "around an extended
pleasure/pain axis."' 57 According to him, "ecosystems are not merely af-
fairs of psychological pains and pleasures. They are life, flourishing in in-
ter-dependencies pressed for creative evolution."58 Ralston points out
that the "highest value attained in the system is lofty individuality with
its subjectivity present in vertebrates, mammals, primates, and preemi-
nently in persons." Yet he argues that "[e]ven the most valuable of the
parts is of less value than the whole." 9 Taking his position as though
humans or other species of higher order may have superior rights but not
to an extent when exercise of such rights will degrade or endanger the
whole ecosystem, these rights are limited only to the extent that one can
flourish within the system.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS - TOWARDS A
JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION OF SPECIES AND
ECOSYSTEM
So far we have separately identified the developments in interna-
tional law with respect to whales and general duties towards animals as
developed in animal rights' literature. In this section an attempt will be
made to synthesize the earlier sections. It might be useful to mention
here a well respected view that it is "very difficult to formulate with func-
tional precision any modern universal view of the 'goals' of international
law whether in terms of human destiny. . . preservation of species, com-
mon interest .. .global justice or otherwise."' Traditionally, interna-
tional law has been slow and far behind municipal law in recognizing any-
thing but States as its subject. However, there is considerable evidence,
both in theory and practice, that the international law is beginning to
recognize individuals as international legal personality.6 ' Another signifi-
55. Stone, supra note 41, at 496.
56. P. WENZ, Ecology, Morality and Hunting, in ETHICS AND ANIMALS, at 188, 190 (H.
Miller, W. Williams eds. 1983).
57. H. RALSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 190 (1988).
58. Id. See also BLACKSTONE, Ethics and Ecology, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISES 16 (W. Blackstone ed. 1974).
59. RALSTON, supra note 57, at 191.
60. Johnston, The Foundations of Justice in International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 117 (R. MacDonald, D. Johnston and G. Morris eds.
1978).
61. W. Bishop, "General Course of Public International Law, 1965," 115 Recueil des
Cours, 268-74 (Vol. II 1965); Lauterpacht, Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LAW Q. REV.
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cant development in international law has been the recognition of state
responsibility for injuries to another state or individuals as well as "irrele-
vance of territorial distinctions. 6 2
Domestic laws have seen recognition of children's rights, rights of in-
sane, and blacks.6 3 Even recognition of the rights of fictitious legal per-
sonalities is well documented in legal literature such as: "trusts, corpora-
tions, joint ventures, municipalities . . . and nation-states." 4 Professor
Stone rightly points out that we have forgotten "how jarring the notion
was to early jurists. 6 s5 He further says that "we are inclined to suppose
the rightlessness of rightless things to be a decree of Nature, not legal
convention acting in support of some status quo."6 It is obvious that
gradual acceptance of the rights of juvenile, insane and many other ficti-
tious personalities to institute cases in their name and be represented by
legal guardians or legal representatives does give us a useful example that
new entities can be recognized by law, and even though without a mind of
their own can be represented through others who shall protect the inter-
ests of 'moral patients' and fictitious personalities.
Going back to the norms of ICRW, we find that the Convention rec-
ognizes that in the interest of the future generations, whales should not
only be saved from extinction but protected. 7 These rights of future gen-
erations are now so much protected that not only ICRW but also the
Stockholm Declaration 6 , and CITES' refer to them. Similarly, the pro-
ponents of animal rights give a very high priority to saving the endan-
gered species or even other animals for future generations.7 It is de-
scribed as "something which is due to the community of the future from
US."1
7 1
Another aspect recognized by IWC and UNCLOS-I was to spare
438 (1947). See generally, T. SUBRAMANYA, RIGHTS AND STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 27-42 (1984); A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS 89-122,
123-147 (1987).
62. D'Amato and Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear Power
Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1037 (1988).
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970);
Stone, supra note 41, at 451.
64. Stone, supra note 41, at 452.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 453.
67. Preamble, IWC, supra note 1.
68. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 15.
69. Preamble CITES, supra note 16, "natural systems of the earth ... must be pro-
tected for this and the generations to come."
70. See generally, RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
(E. Partridge, ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS].
71. Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENER-
ATIONS, id. at 64. See also Fienberg, The Right of Animals and Unborn Generations, in
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, id. at 139; Partridge, Why Care About the Fu-
ture, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, id. at 203.
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whales from pain and suffering.72 This has been given equal importance
in both national legislation 3 and philosophical writings. Rawls recognizes
that the "capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of
life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion
and humanity. 7 4 Protection of endangered species as recognized in the
CITES has many supporting national legislation 75 and at the same time
strongly supported by legal philosophers. Rawls describes destruction of
the whole species as "great evil. 7
6
Protection of ecosystem has been recognized as a management princi-
ple in CCAMLR 77 which will cover whales. Other international measures
include Stockholm Declaration, 78 the U.N. Resolution on World Charter
for the Nature79 and the World Conservation Strategy.8 0 Although this is
a relatively new concept, it has been very widely accepted in international
conventions. Convention on Migratory Species8" is also based on the prin-
ciple of ecosystem management and covers the exclusive economic zone as
well. Since most of the whales stocks are either in the Southern Ocean -
now covered under CCAMLR - or in the 200 mile economic zone, they
will invariably be regulated under the ecosystem management approach.
In addition, this system has a strong support from the philosophers who
support environmental ethics. Ralston strongly argues that we cannot de-
stroy species because that will lead to destruction of ecosystem. 2 There is
no doubt that it is important to protect whales under the ecosystem man-
agement scheme because this approach accords the whales the right to
life and survive as part of the whole ecosystem.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention" has added yet another signifi-
cant measure for the protection of whales, by not only endorsing the IWC
measures but by encouraging the coastal states to adopt even more strin-
gent standards to protect whales. Since most of the whales are in coastal
zones, and are now regulated by several conventions of protectionist na-
ture (CITES, Convention on Migratory Species, Law of the Sea and
ICRW), it is difficult to say that we still don't have a single norm for the
protection of whales. Almost every one of the regulating conventions ad-
vances the ecosystem principle which includes whales, with the exception
72. See supra note 14.
73. See supra note 34.
74. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 512; REGAN, supra note 40, at 153.
75. U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1969, supra note 256; U.K. Endangered Species
(Import and Export) Act, 1977, supra note 290.
76. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 512. See also Regenstein, Animal Rights Endangered
Species and Human Survival, in DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 118 (P. Singer, ed. 1985).
77. Article II (3)(b), CCAMLR supra note 4.
78. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 15.
79. See supra note 21.
80. See supra note 22.
81. See supra note 25.
82. RALSTON, supra note 57, at 190-91.
83. Law of the Sea Convention, Article 65, supra note 3.
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of ICRW. However, the current Moratorium on Commercial Whaling84 to
some extent does reflect the great change in IWC's thinking. What we
have now in international law dealing with the whales is a complex web of
conventions, resolutions and principles which all endorse saving of endan-
gered species, no cruelty and protection of endangered species by protect-
ing the ecosystem's survival. Whatever we may call it, progressive devel-
opment in international law, or now, after 16 years of Stockholm, that
some of these principles have attained the status of customary law - due
to worldwide acceptance in almost all the conventions signed after 1972,
it is clear that ecosystem protection is a new widely accepted norm in
international law and that whales are covered by this norm wherever they
are.
To summarize the whale qualities once again, whales are mammals.
Infants are fed and cared for by their mothers; whales are social animals,
they live in groups and relate to each other as individuals; whales have
exceptionally large brains with well developed area controlling emotions;
whales appear to be capable of enjoying life, playfulness and sense of hu-
mor of small whales is well known; nervous system of whales and the
parts of the brain relating to the perception of pain are essentially similar
to our own; whaling kills whales - that is, it kills intelligent social animals;
the method of killing is often neither quick nor painless. 5
If we apply these qualities to earlier discussion, we will find that
whales are not only self-conscious, one of the requirements set by Kant,8
but do have a biographical life as required by Rachels for "the right to
life,""7 because whales are emotional, playful, sociable and relate to each
other as individuals. Whales feel pain and do go through a lot of pain and
suffering when killed, not only physical but emotional also. They do need
to be saved from this unwanted torture, to satisfy the hunting and sport-
ing desires of man. Also, we can say that whales do clearly fit into the
"moral patient" category of Regan. 8 Applying any standard, we find that
whales do fit into each one of them and yet whales are not fully
protected.
Finally, the whales' rights must be assessed through a test prescribed
by Professor Stone. This test requires that for a thing to be holder of
legal rights, it first should be able to institute legal actions at it's behest;
second, that in granting of the legal relief, court must take injury to it
into account; and third, relief must run to the benefit of it.89 In the
United States there are now several cases where public interest groups
have instituted cases on behalf of whales." In order to give effect to inter-
84. See supra note 20.
85. T. REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN 104-05 (1982).
86. KANT, supra note 45, at 239-40.
87. Rachels, supra note 44, at 275.
88. REGAN, supra note 40, at 153.
89. Stone, supra note 41, at 458.
90. Although, it must be stated here that the authority to file these cases did not arise
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national measures, the U.S. law has made special provisions in the 1967
Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act9' and the Endan-
gered Species Act.9" These legislation specifically authorizes institution of
a legal action whenever it is found that whales will be endangered due to
non-compliance by one of the whaling nations of the IWC recommended
whaling measures. It may be said, that while the U.S. has given effect to
an international norm through its courts, it has also created a legal frame-
work through which in case of injury. Therefore, legal action can be insti-
tuted on behalf of the whales. However, at this time no action has been
filed or indeed can be filed in the name of whales or a whale.
The second condition set by Stone relates to injury to it, which in
this case is whales. There is no doubt that every time a public interest
group brings a case before the U.S. courts, the case is filed only when the
interest group has determined that the requirements set forth in Pelly
Amendment or that of Endangered Species Act have been met and that
in effect will diminish the effectiveness of the standards set by the IWC
for the conservation of whales and thus cause injury to whales." The
third condition requires that relief must run to the benefit of it, i.e.,
whales. In all the cases the relief provided for does directly affect whales
by protecting them from further taking and killing. There is no reason
why it cannot be construed that whales should get direct benefit from any
relief granted. In the case of whales, once again we find that nearly all
requirements set by various scholarly writings have been satisfied.
V. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
Not one, but the whole aggregate of international and national laws
and the conditions set by the philosophers in regard to our duty towards
animals, particularly towards marine mammals, and whales' right to sur-
vival can be said to have been met. There is clear recognition in interna-
tional law especially in the areas where whales generally habit, of the
right of ecosystem to exist as a whale and our duty to protect those eco-
systems and through them the whales. Whenever an attempt is made to
make additions on the list of those who enjoy legal rights, it is met with
strong resistance. After all, rights are not created suddenly. It takes time,
even though it may appear that rights are there. Even Hugo Grotius says
that "it was the Creator's intention, when he gave everything certain nat-
ural properties, that it should preserve its existence and should achieve
its highest destiny. '94 Hayden sums up our contemporary attitude in
from any rights accorded to whales, but rather through legislative action of the United
States Congress. The Congress has recognized that the international standard set by the
IWC for the protection and conservation of whales is to be enforced.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 1978, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786.
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1540(g).
93. Greenpeace U.S.A. et. al v. United States, Civil Action No. 88-2158, Aug. 8, 1988,
(pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia).
94. F. DEPAUW, GROTIUS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 23 (1965) Grotius, the creator the
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most appropriate words when he writes, "[i]t seems incredible that with
all our talents of rationality and skill, all our genius for creative thought
and visible achievement, a shameless, reckless waste still rules much of
human behavior." 95 There is no dearth of scholarly writings which sup-
port conservation and condemn reckless, senseless whaling activity.
We have seen gradual development of international legal principles
from rational resource management to conservation, to protection of en-
dangered species, to protection of habitat, to protection of ecosystem. It
has been slow in coming, yet it is a forceful movement in the right direc-
tion which has evolved beyond the fragmented and isolated conservation
measures to a wholesome approach of protecting the whole - the ecosys-
tem, balance of which must always be preserved. Similarly, the animal
rights and anti-cruelty movement went through a metamorphosis from
cosmetic anti-cruelty laws regulating the pets and other domesticated an-
imals, to protection of higher species (mammals), to protection of endan-
gered species towards the development of animals' right to life and then
to protection of their habitat and ecosystem. In many modern writings,
these thoughts and arguments have been developed systematically to in-
clude the protection of nature.
Man indeed has come a long way; though the progress appears slow,
it has been remarkably fast in the last fifteen years. A movement, a phi-
losophy, a framework of international legal mechanisms has developed
and gained recognition. It is evident from the IWC's growing membership
and its support of global conservationist public opinion to protect whales
and to save them from pain and suffering. According to Greenwalt, "[i]t is
disputable to use the term 'animal rights' no matter how stringent the
duties of human beings."96 He describes this label as "loose" because as
he says, "The category of entities warranting protection might be nar-
rower, or perhaps broader, than all animals. '97 It does not seem to be a
sound rational basis to dismiss the viability of the term 'animal rights'.
Whether entities warranting protection are more or less than our esti-
mates is no reason to refuse to translate our duties towards animals into
animal right.
Man has evolved beyond the stage which Greenwalt is discussing.
Man is now in the era where we talk about protecting ecosystems as a
whole, rather than individual entities. We no longer confine our moral
duties to be limited to threatened species warranting protection. Modern
international law supports and subscribes to the principles of ecosystem
and habitat protection. Conversely, if Man translates his duties owed to
theory of freedom of seas, strong believer in the res nullius status of ocean fisheries and one
of the supporters of early seventeenth century whaling admits that we ought to preserve the
existence of these resources. Id. at 63.
95. S. HAYDEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE 14 (1942).
96. Greenwalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Pro-
tecting Animals and the Environment, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 (1986).
97. Id. at 1026.
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ecosystem, he has indirectly recognized the right to survival of individual
entities in the form of a composite right of survival of ecosystem. The
only way to deny this right is to withdraw this ecosystem approach from
all three facets: international law, domestic laws, and philosophical writ-
ings supporting ecosystem approach. Perhaps it is too late now to undo
all the developments which have created a new right - that is the right
to survive. Customary international law, progressive developments in the
area of law, and rational thinking all have now created a new right for the
whales of the world - a right to survive as part of an ecosystem.
